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Abstract: The COVID-19 pandemic has made it especially visible that mortality 
data are a key component of epidemiological models, being a single indicator 
that provides information about various health aspects, such as disease preva-
lence and effectiveness of interventions, and thus enabling predictions on 
many fronts. In this paper we illustrate the interrelation between facts and val-
ues in death statistics, by analyzing the rules for death certification issued by 
the World Health Organization. We show how the notion of the underlying 
cause of death can change in view of public health goals. This brings us to a 
general point about how non-epistemic factors, such as values and goals, are 
reflected in the choice of different measures in epidemiological models. We fi-
nally argue that this analysis is not only relevant from a theoretical point of 
view but also has important practical consequences.
Keywords: cause of death; COVID-19; epidemiological models; non-epistemic 
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1. Introduction 
The current pandemic has made it especially visible that mortality data 
are a key component of epidemiological models, being a single indicator 
that provides information about various health aspects, such as disease 
prevalence and effectiveness of interventions, and thus enabling predic-
tions on many fronts. In what follows, we will illustrate the interrelation 
between facts and values, that is, between epistemic and non-epistemic 
factors, in determining mortality data and then in realizing epidemiologi-
cal models. More precisely, in section 2 we will analyze the rules for death 
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certification issued by the World Health Organization with a specific fo-
cus on COVID-19 and we will show how the notion of the underlying 
cause of death can change in view of the public health goals of prevention 
and treatment, that is in view of non-epistemic factors. Then, in section 3, 
we will explain how mortality data might affect epidemiological models 
and we will evaluate how the choice of different measures in epidemiolog-
ical models can also be affected by non-epistemic factors, such as social 
values and public goals. Finally, in section 4 we will argue that recogniz-
ing the presence of both epistemic and non-epistemic factors in epidemio-
logical models does not undermine their objectivity or usefulness, and 
that our analysis is not only relevant from a theoretical point of view but 
also has important practical consequences.
2. Facts and values in determining whether COVID-19 is the 
underlying cause of death
The starting point of our analysis is assessing how a death due to COV-
ID-19 is recorded and certified during the current pandemic. In order to do 
that, a brief analysis of the rules for the compilation of a death certificate 
that have been issued by the World Health Organization is necessary1. 
These rules are in fact intended to provide instructions to reliably compile a 
death certificate, which is the form that contains all the relevant details 
about the deceased and, in particular, the specification of the so-called un-
derlying cause of death, that is, “(a) the disease or injury that initiated the se-
quence of morbid events that led directly to death, or (b) the circumstances 
of the accident or violent act that produced the fatal injury”2. This docu-
ment must be completed by a doctor and a state official within 24 hours of 
the death, being then available for epidemiological and statistical research. 
As we will see in the next section, it is pivotal not only that death certifi-
cates are filled in carefully, with the indication of the real cause of death, but 
also that they are drafted consistently and uniformly across all countries, so 
that the epidemiological and statistical models developed on their basis can 
be trustworthy and authentically useful. This becomes particularly relevant 
 1 World Health Organization, Medical certification of cause of death: Instructions for physi-
cians on use of international form of medical certificate of cause of death, World Health Organiza-
tion, Geneva 1979; World Health Organization, Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) Pandemic, 
2020, https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019 (accessed 6/12/2020).
 2 World Health Organization, Medical certification of cause of death, 1979, cit., p. 6.
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in the case of a pandemic like that of COVID-19 as the mortality data ob-
tained by looking at death certificates and the epidemiological models built 
on their basis inform media and institutional communication daily as well as 
the health policies and measures carried out by different governments.
Apart from small differences from country to country, the current for-
mat of a death certificate has been standardized by the WHO, which also 
establishes the exact codes of all the various diseases, as contained in the 
International Classification of Diseases, now in its eleventh edition (ICD-
11). The WHO’s death certificate has two main parts. 
The first and most important part must be filled in with an indication 
of the exact sequence of diseases or conditions that led to the death, starting 
with the one that directly caused the death, that is, the so-called precipi-
tating cause, then continuing in the line below with the disease or condi-
tion that caused the first one (expressed by the wording ‘due to’), then 
again in the line below with the disease or condition that caused the sec-
ond one, and so forth, up to the underlying cause of death. A very simple 
example could be the following causal sequence: 1) Acute respiratory dis-
tress syndrome (precipitating cause), 2) Pneumonia, 3) COVID-19 with 
positive test (underlying cause of death). 
The second part of the death certificate must instead be filled out with 
the indication of all those conditions that are believed to have increased the 
risk or the severity of the underlying cause, but that are not part of the caus-
al chain that directly led to death. As an example, if in the first part of the 
death certificate COVID-19 is indicated as the underlying cause of death, 
the second part can contain an indication of pre-existing chronic conditions 
(such as diabetes, coronary artery disease, circulatory diseases or cancers) or 
conditions that cause a reduction in lung capacity (such as asthma or 
COPD, that is, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease) capable of aggravat-
ing the clinical picture of COVID-19 and thus increasing the risk of death. 
Filling in a death certificate is thus a very complex process, which in-
cludes diagnosis, certification and coding. Such a process can give rise to 
different types of errors, both systematic and accidental. Excluding manual 
and/or automatic coding errors, both the diagnosis and the identification 
of the underlying cause of death as well as a description of the exact se-
quence of diseases or conditions that eventually led to death not only de-
pend on the experience of the physician but can also be influenced by vari-
ous factors, such as the age and sex of the patient or the context of death3. 
 3 L. McGivern, L. Shulman, J.K. Carney, S. Shapiro, E. Bundock, Death certification errors 
and the effect on mortality statistics, “Public Health Rep”, 132, 6, 2017, pp. 669-675. 
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One of the most relevant issues in compiling a death certificate con-
cerns the uniqueness of the underlying cause of death. On the one hand, 
the WHO document explicitly states that identifying a single underlying 
cause of death is fundamental for epidemiological and statistical purpos-
es; on the other hand, it is also recognized that it is increasingly frequent 
that death occurs in the presence of different diseases or conditions, thus 
posing a problem of selection. For this reason, the WHO also defines a 
set of rules to distinguish the underlying cause of death (along with the 
train of all other diseases or conditions that eventually led to death) from 
those other diseases or conditions that must simply be considered to have 
increased the risk or the severity of the underlying cause.
At first glance, it may seem that the underlying cause of death, which 
triggered the whole sequence of morbid events that led directly to death, 
must be identified simply looking at the pathogenetic mechanisms that 
emerged from biomedical research and are certified by scientific consen-
sus, such as the mechanism that describes how the SARS-COV-2 virus 
binds to human cells and then replicates inside them. Indirect evidence 
that the WHO adopts a mechanistic view of causality can be represented 
by the so-called unacceptable or illogical causal sequences, which repre-
sent cases of pathogenetic mechanisms that do not exist from a medical 
point of view and thus cannot be included in a death certificate. For ex-
ample, infectious diseases – such as COVID-19 – cannot be due to any 
other condition4; so, reporting COPD as the cause of COVID-19 would 
constitute an illogical causal sequence since COPD cannot cause an infec-
tious disease such as COVID-19. 
In the WHO document, however, we also read that “the expression ‘due 
to’ printed between the lines of the first part of the death certificate apply 
not only to sequences with a pathological or etiological basis, but also to se-
quences in which an antecedent condition is held responsible for having 
prepared the way for the most direct cause”5. This means that the choice of 
a specific causal chain is not wholly based on pure biomedical evidence.
The WHO document also recognizes that it is not easy for a doctor to 
decide when a certain disease or condition should be listed in the causal 
sequence that leads directly to death and nor among the diseases or con-
 4 World Health Organization, International statistical classification of diseases and related 
health problems, 11th revision (ICD-11), Reference Guide, 2018, https://icd.who.int/icd11ref-
guide/en/index.html (accessed 12/12/2020), sect. 2.21.
 5 World Health Organization, Medical certification of cause of death, 1979, cit., p. 8, empha-
sis added.
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ditions that simply increase the risk or the severity of the underlying 
cause. The suggestion – actually rather vague – is to include in the second 
part of the death certificate all those conditions that are relevant to death 
but that do not seem to be able to coherently fit into the causal sequence 
reported in the first part6. However, it is evident that the selection of the 
causal sequence that leads directly to death, and in particular of the un-
derlying cause of death, is by no means a simple and linear process. 
For example, generally speaking, COVID-19 can be considered the un-
derlying cause of death (and thus included in the first part of a death cer-
tificate) when it has triggered all the other diseases or conditions, as re-
corded by the doctor, which directly culminated in the patient’s death 
(such as pneumonia or acute respiratory distress syndrome). In this case, 
potential pre-existing chronic conditions (such as diabetes, coronary ar-
tery disease, circulatory diseases, cancers, asthma or COPD) capable of 
aggravating the clinical picture of COVID-19 and increasing the risk of 
death must be reported in the second part of the death certificate as they 
do not coherently fit into the causal sequence that actually led to death 
and is reported in the first part. On the other hand, COVID-19 can also 
occur simultaneously with other diseases or conditions that actually lead 
directly to death. In this case, COVID-19, not being part of the causal se-
quence that leads directly to death, should not be indicated in the first 
part of the death certificate, but (possibly) in the second part, among the 
conditions that increased the risk or severity of the underlying cause. This 
could be the case of an individual with COVID-19 who has a car accident 
or a myocardial infarction due to a pre-existing coronary artery disease 
(which is thus considered the underlying cause of death). 
While the two alternatives above are rather clear from a theoretical 
point of view, they are much less so in practice. Given the sequence of 
causes listed in the first part of the death certificate, why must COVID-19 
– and not, say, pneumonia or acute respiratory distress syndrome – be 
identified as the underlying cause of death, that is, as the real cause of 
death? Or, more relevantly, how is it possible to choose the underlying 
cause of death in a non-arbitrary way in the event that there are two or 
more plausible causal sequences that result in death? To put it differently, 
how to decide that COVID-19 is the underlying cause of death and coro-
nary artery disease is just an aggravating factor or, vice versa, that coro-
nary artery disease is the underlying cause of death and COVID-19 just 
an aggravating factor?
 6 Ivi, p. 9.
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According to the WHO, the selection of the underlying cause of death 
must be carried out with a view to preventing premature deaths and thus 
to hindering the precipitating cause from acting, which are the most effec-
tive goals for public health7. In other words, the choice of the underlying 
cause of death must be made not only on the basis of biomedical evi-
dence, but also with the primary objectives of prevention and treatment in 
mind: the underlying cause of death must thus be identified with the dis-
ease or condition that can be better manipulated in order to realize the 
most effective goals for public health8. As we have already argued9, the 
WHO adopts a mechanistic view of causality but with an interventionist 
criterion to select the real cause of death: among the various plausible 
causal sequences (that is, the various plausible pathogenetic mechanisms) 
that led to death, the underlying cause of death must be identified with 
the disease or conditions that can be acted upon, plausibly at the popula-
tion level, with prevention and treatment in mind. For example, let us as-
sume that COVID-19 (A) and coronary artery disease (B) both led to 
death, but preventing A is easier than B, then A must be identified as the 
underlying cause of death, or if both conditions are equally possible to 
prevent but blocking A is more effective in avoiding premature deaths, 
then A must be identified as the underlying cause of death. Non-epistem-
ic factors thus play a key role in the selection of COVID-19 as the real 
cause of that.
In the case of COVID-19, moreover, the situation is further complicat-
ed by the fact that a death caused by COVID-19 could be correctly re-
corded on a death certificate even in cases where the infection is only sus-
pected or probable. The WHO in fact defines death caused by COV-
ID-19 in the following way: “A death due to COVID-19 is defined for 
surveillance purposes as a death resulting from a clinically compatible 
[symptomatic] disease, in a probable or confirmed case of COVID-19 in-
fection, unless a clearly alternative cause of death exists, which cannot be 
related to COVID-19 (for example, trauma). There should not be a peri-
od of complete recovery from COVID-19 between illness and death. A 
death due to COVID-19 may not be attributed to another disease (e.g., 
cancer) and should be considered as such regardless of pre-existing con-
 7 Ivi, p. 5.
 8 B.I.B. Lindahl, On the selection of causes of death: An analysis of WHO’s rules for selection 
of the underlying cause of death, in L. Nordenfelt, B.I.B. Lindahl (eds.), Health, disease, and caus-
al explanations in medicine, Springer, Dordrecht 1984, pp. 137-152.
 9 M.C. Amoretti, E. Lalumera, COVID-19 as the underlying cause of death: disentangling 
facts and values, “History and Philosophy of Life Sciences”, 43, 1, 2020, 4, pp. 1-4.
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ditions that are suspected to have triggered a severe course of COVID-
19”10. Therefore, COVID-19 can be correctly considered the underlying 
cause of death even in the case of a mere suspicion, that is in the absence 
of a swab or serological test or other diagnostic imaging procedure that 
reliably confirms the infection. 
To sum up, the WHO intends to consider COVID-19 as the underly-
ing cause of death in all those cases in which it has actually caused, or is 
supposed to have caused, or contributed to causing the death of the pa-
tient11. Such a recommendation may seem rather surprising, but it is in 
line with other indications in the ICD-11, which explain that the accepta-
bility or otherwise of a causal sequence for the coding of mortality de-
pends not only on biomedical assessments, but also on public health con-
siderations. For this reason, a medically acceptable causal relationship 
could instead be judged unacceptable in the coding instructions as a later 
element in the causal chain is deemed more important from a public 
health perspective12. Therefore, in our case, overwhelming public health 
reasons make it possible to indicate COVID-19 as the underlying cause of 
death even in the case of a mere unconfirmed suspicion, and thus to iden-
tify COVID-19 as the underlying cause of death even in the presence of 
other and independent causal chains that led to death. Such a rule con-
forms with the idea that the underlying cause of death must be selected 
with the primary objectives of prevention and treatment in mind.
3. Facts and values in epidemiological models: choosing between 
different parameters
As we have seen in the previous section, correctly reporting a COV-
ID-19 infection on a death certificate is essential to understand how many 
individuals have actually died from COVID-19. Choosing between multi-
ple alternatives and independent causal sequences (or between converg-
ing pathogenetic mechanisms) that result in death, however, is not always 
simple and immediate, and involves not only facts but also values taking 
into account the objectives of prevention and treatment. 
 10 World Health Organization, Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) Pandemic, 2020, cit., p. 3, 
emphasis added.
 11 Ibidem.
 12 World Health Organization, International statistical classification of diseases and related 
health problems, Reference Guide, 2018, cit., sect. 2.19.2.
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The philosophical question of what counts as a death due to COV-
ID-19 is philosophically interesting for its own sake, as it involves a reflec-
tion on conceptions of causality, and on the problem of the selection 
among potential concurrent causes. However, it is also and prominently 
relevant to understand, and ultimately to assess, epidemiological models 
of the current pandemic. 
Generally speaking, epidemiological models are mathematical tools 
built to explain complex medical phenomena, such as the COVID-19 
pandemic. Most of them have the structure of so-called SEIR models, that 
is, they represent individuals in a population as moving through four 
states – Susceptible to the disease, Exposed, Infected, and Removed (de-
ceased or recovered) – as affected by various factors13. They can have the 
goal of predicting infection rates or death rates for a time and population, 
and/or to test the effect of mitigation strategies or other policies enforced 
by governments, as well as the effect of other factors such as schools reo-
pening or seasonal change in infections and deaths. They are currently 
what national and local institutions mostly base their strategies on. Promi-
nent models from the beginning of the pandemic were the Imperial Col-
lege Model, the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME) 
Model, the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), 
and the Youyang Gu (YYG) model.
As the number of Infected is always unknown (as not everyone is test-
ed), most of these models ‘fit’ confirmed deaths and calculate back how 
many infections would have been likely to produce such a result14. As we 
illustrated in the previous section, confirmed deaths due to COVID-19 
are formally registered by national health authorities in a standardized 
way, so they make for ‘good’ data in this context. Models of the pandemic 
also build on data about the virus (the notorious R, the basic reproductive 
number, that is the average number of cases generated by a single infected 
individual), and about the population, such as age, mobility, health status, 
and family structure. 
Data of all these sorts can come in either good or bad quality, and they can 
be scarce or sufficient, they can be either freshly collected, or rather retrieved 
from registries and repositories filled out in the past, with no control by the re-
 13 M.J. Keeling, K.T. Eames, Networks and epidemic models, “Journal of the Royal Society 
Interface”, 2, 4, 2005, pp. 295-307.
 14 C. Giattino, How epidemiological models of COVID-19 help us estimate the true number of 
infections. Our World in Data, 2020, https://ourworldindata.org/covid-models, (accessed 
12/01/2021).
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searchers now working on the model. Whatever the merits of these criticisms, 
the general point they presuppose is that for their epistemic credentials – in or-
der to qualify as providing explanations and predictions of the phenomenon – 
models depend on the quality of data they are fed with. This is a point we will 
not pursue further, as it has been widely discussed in the recent literature15.
In the first part of this paper, we discussed a definition, that of death 
due to COVID-19, and showed that in itself it is value-laden. This means 
that epidemiological models that use data about the number of deaths 
due to COVID-19 are assuming data that are not ‘pure’ but constitutively 
dependent on non-epistemic values, such as the importance of prevention 
and treatment. However, models also depend crucially on parameters and 
definitions of parameters. These are not data, but conceptual tools that 
epidemiologists pick and choose – albeit with a limited degree of freedom 
– in order to manage data, with a view to the explanation and prediction 
of a phenomenon. Let us now broaden the view, and consider different 
parameters related to death, from which epidemiologists can, and do, 
pick and choose in model-building. 
The first is infection fatality ratio (IFR), which estimates this propor-
tion of deaths among all infected individuals. The second death-related 
parameter is case fatality ratio (CFR), which estimates this proportion of 
deaths among identified confirmed cases. They are both measures of the 
severity of the disease. Moreover, both IFR and CFR have the definition 
of death due to COVID-19 as an ingredient, and thus inherit, so to say, 
the value component we highlighted in the previous section. However, 
they are also significantly different. 
IFR is the most speculative parameter, so to say, as it heavily depends 
both on testing, and on prior biological knowledge of the mechanisms of 
virus transmission. CFR is less speculative, but it is nevertheless exposed 
to specific biases (systematic errors). On a WHO fact sheet published in 
August 2020, we read that if deaths are more likely to be reported than 
recoveries, CFR will be overestimated, and the reverse leads to underesti-
mation16. Biases apart, it is known that risk of death from COVID-19 is 
unevenly distributed among groups stratified by age, socio-economic sta-
tus and ethnicity17. Choosing an undifferentiated CFR parameter is likely 
 15 For a review see, e.g., G.T.H. Ellison, COVID-19 and the epistemology of epidemiological 
models at the dawn of AI, “Annals of Human Biology”, 47, 2020, pp. 506-513.
 16 World Health Organization, Estimating mortality from Covid-19, 2020, https://www.who.
int/news-room/commentaries/detail/estimating-mortality-from-covid-19 (accessed 22/01/2020).
 17 G. Onder, G. Rezza, S. Brusaferro, Case-fatality rate and characteristics of patients dying in 
relation to COVID-19 in Italy, “JAMA”, 323, 2020, pp. 1775-1776; S. Sze, D. Pan, C.R. Nevill, 
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to mask such differences in the predictions of a model, whereas choosing 
stratified CFR measures is likely to make them apparent. Such a choice 
involves social and ethical considerations, as models are intended to guide 
institutional interventions.
Another death-related parameter is the number of overall excessive 
deaths in a population – for example, the number of overall excessive 
deaths in Lombardy, Northern Italy, in March 2020, compared to the 
same region in November 2020 or March 2019. The choice of a measure 
of overall excessive deaths, versus deaths due to COVID-19 only, can 
show how the virus impacts on the overall health of the population, for 
example by limiting the quality and access of treatments for other pathol-
ogies, such as cancers, cardiovascular diseases, and so on. Therefore, the 
choice of this measure also implicitly assumes that actions aimed at pre-
venting such an impact are worth taking.
Finally, using death parameters implies focusing on the goal of preserv-
ing life in general, and treating all deaths equally. Preserving life in gener-
al and treating all deaths equally is obviously good from an ethical point 
of view, but it can be qualified further when it comes to choosing the 
goals of healthcare strategies. A possible alternative to death parameters is 
counting Potential Years of Life Lost (PYLL). PYLL is a measure of the 
time a person would have lived had he or she not died prematurely. 
Choosing PYLL as a parameter means that not all deaths are treated 
equally, as greater weight is given to deaths at a younger age and a lower 
weight to deaths at an older age18.
We can easily see how death-related values and life-years lost values 
come apart when, as in the case of COVID-19, mortality is unevenly dis-
tributed on ages, and disproportionally affects the elderly. Differently, the 
Spanish flu killed people with average age of 28 and its burden in terms 
of number of life-years lost has been calculated as about 1,000-times high-
er than COVID-19 as of June 2020. 
Governments’ mitigation strategies and interventions can be affected 
by the choice of death-related or years-lost related parameters in a pre-
dictive model. It is plausible that, in some contexts, closing schools may 
L.J. Gray, C.A. Martin, J. Nazareth, J.S. Minhas et al., Ethnicity and Clinical Outcomes in 
Covid-19: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, “EClinicalMedicine”, 29-30, 2020, 100630, 
pp. 1-17.
 18 A.K. Mitra, M. Payton, N. Kabir, A. Whitehead, K.N. Ragland, A. Brown, Potential years 
of life lost due to COVID-19 in the United States, Italy, and Germany: An old formula with newer 
ideas, “International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health”, 17, 12, 2020, 4392, 
pp. 1-9.
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have an immediate decreasing effect on death-related values, but also an 
increasing effect on life-years lost in the long term, as life expectancy is 
known to decrease with school-years lost19. A model with only one of 
the two parameters would have the effect of orienting political decisions 
in favor or against school closing, while a model incorporating both 
could give a wider picture. Admittedly, effects of interventions on 
PYYL are more difficult to quantify and predict, as they locate in the 
distant future. However, not to consider such parameters at all in mode-
ling a phenomenon is in itself a choice, and one that cannot be made on 
purely factual grounds20.
4. Conclusions
To sum up, the aim of this paper was to unpack the various roles that 
non-epistemic factors might have in the making of epidemiological mod-
els of COVID-19, first by a zoom-in on the definition of death due to 
COVID-19 (section 2), then with a bird’s-eye view on different parame-
ters that can be incorporated into predictive epidemiological models (sec-
tion 3). Specifically, the definition of a death due to COVID-19 rests on a 
choice, the choice of positively evaluating the goal of fostering public 
health through disease prevention and treatment, over the goal of preserv-
ing the epistemic and biomedical soundness of a causal inference about 
the underlying cause of death. In its turn, this definition figures as a com-
ponent of death-related parameters, such as IFR and CFR. Death-related 
parameters, however, collectively represent only one option, as other 
measures may optionally be considered when modeling, such as life-years 
lost. Choosing between different parameters in epidemiological modeling 
does not depend on facts only, but also on goals and value assumptions, 
that is on non-epistemic factors. 
Arguing that non-epistemic factors play a key role not only in deter-
mining what counts as a death due to COVID-19 but also in realizing the 
epidemiological models of the current pandemic, we do not mean to 
claim that such mortality data and epidemiological models are flawed, un-
 19 D.A. Christakis, W. Van Cleve, F.J. Zimmerman, Estimation of US children’s educational 
attainment and years of life lost associated with primary school closures during the coronavirus dis-
ease 2019 pandemic, “JAMA Network Open”, 3, 11, 2020, e2028786. 
 20 J. Fuller, Why coronavirus death rates can’t be summed up in one simple number, “The 
Conversation”, April 10, 2020, https://theconversation.com/why-coronavirus-death-rates-cant-
be-summed-up-in-one-simple-number-135758 (accessed 22/01/2021).
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reliable, useless or non-purely scientific. That non-epistemic factors play 
an important and unavoidable role in the scientific enterprise – not only 
in medicine but also in the so-called ‘hard’ sciences – is a widely recog-
nized and well-documented issue, defended on historical, sociological, 
and philosophical grounds21. More importantly, it has convincingly been 
argued that the presence of non-epistemic factors within the various sci-
ences does not undermine their epistemic reliability and objectivity but 
can possibly strengthen it22. For instance, Helen Longino23 argues that 
scientific objectivity lies in the fact that scientific statements and models 
can be inter-subjectively tested and criticized, thus being a social product. 
Alternatively, Sandra Harding24 claims that certain standpoints – those of 
marginalized and underprivileged social groups – are epistemically privi-
leged or advantaged and thus the presence of their associated values in 
the scientific enterprise can be beneficial. 
The fact that the mortality data of COVID-19 and the epidemiological 
models attempting to describe the current pandemic depend on both 
epistemic and non-epistemic factors is not only relevant from a theoretical 
point of view but also has many important practical consequences. Specif-
ically, it makes it clear that such data and models should be explained and 
discussed publicly. On the one hand, the interplay of facts and values 
must be made explicit to the general public and the two components 
must be carefully separated and evaluated independently. On the other 
hand, and more importantly, it must be clarified that whereas facts can 
only be acknowledged, values and goal-related choices may and should be 
rationally discussed on practical and ethical grounds (this is why knowing 
where they are located, in the complex machinery of models, can be ex-
tremely useful). For example, are prevention and treatment good things 
to be pursued? Should all deaths be considered equally? What conflicting 
values are possibly at stake? Such a discussion must be open and public, 
 21 H. Douglas, Inductive risk and values in science, “Philosophy of Science”, 67, 2000, pp. 
559-579; H. Kincaid, J. Dupré, A. Wylie, Value-free science? Ideals and illusions, Oxford Univer-
sity Press, Oxford, 2007; T. Kuhn, The structure of scientific revolutions, The University of Chica-
go Press, Chicago IL 1962.
 22 E. Anderson, Uses of value judgements in science: A general argument, with lessons from a 
case study of feminist research on divorce, “Hypatia”, 19, 2004, pp. 1-24; J.A. Kourany, Philosophy 
of science after feminism, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010; S. Harding, Whose science? 
Whose knowledge? Thinking from women’s lives, Cornell University Press, Ithaca 1991; Id., “Strong 
objectivity”: A response to the new objectivity question, “Synthese”, 104, 1995, pp. 331-349.
 23 H.E. Longino, Science as social knowledge: Values and objectivity in scientific inquiry, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton 1990.
 24 S. Harding, Whose science?, cit.
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and not concealed in some secret cabinet, as the consequences of a choice 
of alternative values and goals will have a great impact on everybody’s 
lives. In this paper we do not aim at assessing potential different choices 
along with their consequences, but simply at suggesting the importance of 
making these choices explicit in order to improve the collective under-
standing of the current pandemic and to clarify the rationale of specific 
health polices and measures, as well as political decisions.
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